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Case No. 20180109-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

STEVEN NORMAN POWELL,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
While shopping with her stepmom at Walmart, 24-year-old Anastasia
saw defendant Steven Norman Powell, who was wheelchair-bound, with the
crotch of his pants cut out or pulled down and his genitals exposed; only a
very see-through netting was placed over them. Anastasia got her stepmom
and she saw the same thing. About a month later during “Black Friday”
shopping, Anastasia and her stepmom were at Shopko and Anastasia again
saw Powell with his genitals exposed, as before. She got her stepmom, and
she too saw Powell with his genitals exposed and tried to snap a photo of him
as evidence. But Powell saw her and covered his crotch with the leg of a pair
of slacks hanging on a rack just before she snapped the picture.

The stepmom filed a complaint a day after the Shopko incident, but it
was not investigated until some nine months later. The detective on the case
learned that Walmart had recorded over its surveillance footage, but he was
able to view relevant surveillance footage from Shopko. The video confirmed
that Powell was at the Shopko on Black Friday, showing him enter and exit
the store. The detective was also able to somewhat track Powell’s movements
in the store—camera coverage was not complete—but he saw no footage
showing Powell with his genitals exposed. The detective took a screenshot
picture of Powell in the store and another of his van in the parking lot as
evidence he was there.
The detective later interviewed Powell at his home. Powell admitted
that he had been to the Walmart and Shopko and when asked why he
exposed himself, Powell explained that he did it for the thrill of it. He said
that he had resorted to this behavior after he was paralyzed from the waist
down in an accident at age 27.
Powell claims on appeal that his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in representing him, but he has not hurdled the high bar required
for such a claim. He claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving to
dismiss the case on due process grounds, arguing that the State failed to
preserve the video evidence. But the State never possessed the Walmart
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surveillance—it had already been recorded over before the detective could
see it—and the detective only collected the screenshots from the Shopko
video. Moreover, the record does not support Powell’s claim that the Shopko
video was lost or destroyed. In light of controlling caselaw, reasonable
counsel could conclude that a motion to dismiss would fail. And among the
reasons it would fail is that the video would show no more than what the
State admitted—the video did not show Powell with his genitals exposed.
Powell also claims that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
elements instructions for lewdness. But again, reasonable counsel could
conclude that the elements instructions accurately set forth the law, i.e.,
lewdness does not involve an attempt, the relevant mental state for lewdness
includes recklessness, and caselaw defining “any other act of lewdness” did
not apply in this case because Powell’s charges rested on evidence that he
exposed his genitals.
Powell also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence. But where Anastasia and
her mother testified that they saw Powell with his genitals exposed in
Walmart and Shopko, and Powell admitted to the detective that he was at the
stores on the nights in question and exposed himself for the thrill of it, the
evidence was more than sufficient to submit the case to the jury.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for (a) not moving to
dismiss the case on the ground that Powell’s due process rights were violated
by the police department’s alleged failure to preserve surveillance video, and
(b) not objecting to the elements instructions on lewdness?1
Standard of Review. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised
for the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6,
89 P.3d 162. That said, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance [is] highly
deferential,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), and this Court
will not reverse for ineffective assistance unless “no competent attorney”
would have proceeded as counsel did in this case and it prejudiced the
defense, see Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011).
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support Powell’s convictions for
lewdness?
Standard of Review. A trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed
verdict is reviewed for correctness. State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶21, 345 P.3d

1

Powell addresses his two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC)
claims in two points. He addresses his IAC claim related to the alleged due
process violation in point III of his brief, see Aplt.Br. 35-50, but the State
addresses it in point I.A of its brief. He addresses his IAC claim related to the
elements instructions in point I of his brief, Aplt.Br. 5-20, but the State
addresses it in point I.B of its brief.
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1168. But in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the State” and must uphold the denial
of a directed verdict motion so long as “some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶27 (cleaned up).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.
Twenty-four-year-old Anastasia and her stepmom had two separate
encounters with Powell, who was wheelchair bound, in which he exposed his
genitals. R393,396-99.
1. Powell exposes himself at Walmart.
On a weekend evening in October 2014, Anastasia, together with her
stepmom, aunt, and some of her stepmom’s coworkers, interrupted their craft
night with a snack run at Walmart. R393-96,413, 429-30,444-45. After arriving
at the store, Anastasia split off from the group to make her way toward the
cosmetics section. R395,430.
As Anastasia walked down the main aisle toward the cosmetics
section, she saw Powell, with his penis exposed, emerge from the women’s
clothing section and into the main aisle where she was walking. R395-99. She
was less than five feet from him. R414. And Powell did “not just [have] his
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zipper down, but, like, full-on nothing [was] covering down there”—only
some kind of “like fishnet stockings that you wear for maybe a costume” that
is [v]ery see-through.” R396. It was almost as if he owned “a pair of pants
with nothing” in the crotch area, “like [it had been] cut out,” because it was
“more than just [the] zipper being down that [she] could see.” R398.
Anastasia left the area to find her stepmom and aunt, told them that
“this guy just flashed” her, and led them back to Powell to verify what she
had just witnessed. R399,414-17,431. When they returned, Powell had just left
women’s clothing and was in the jewelry section. R399,416. He did not appear
to be shopping for anything and his genitals were still exposed. R399-400.
Anastasia’s stepmom looked at Powell for 30-40 seconds and saw the same
thing Anastasia had—Powell had “jeans on and the crotch was cut out with
some black mesh, and [she] saw his penis.” R432-33,445-47.
The women reported what they had seen to Walmart personnel, who
escorted Powell from the store. R400-01,417,434,447. Walmart did not report
the incident to the police. R482.
2. One month later, Powell exposes himself at Shopko.
The following month on Thanksgiving night, Anastasia went to
Shopko for Black Friday shopping with her two younger brothers and her
stepmom, who met them there. R402,405,418,427. Anastasia encountered
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Powell again with his genitals exposed as before. R403-04,419. She saw him
in the children’s clothing section and was about 20 feet from Powell. R40304,419. He was “wearing the same” jeans with nothing covering his crotch
and she clearly saw his genitals. R404,419. It felt “creepy.” R421,424.
Anastasia found her stepmom, told her that Powell was in the store,
and was exposing himself. R405,435.2 Both women couldn’t believe this was
“happening again.” R405,435-36. Hoping to take a picture of Powell in the
act, Anastasia’s stepmom got her smartphone and found Powell, still
exposed, in the men’s clothing section adjacent to children’s clothing.
R405,419-20,436. When the stepmom initially walked near him, she could not
get a clear picture, so she walked past and then returned and took a picture.
R437-38,441. But Powell saw her with smartphone in hand and just before she
snapped the picture, he grabbed the leg of a pair of slacks hanging on a rack
and placed it over his genitals. R407-10,420-21,438-40; SE1 (photo taken by
stepmom).
The women left and notified Shopko personnel, but were subsequently
told that he was seen leaving the store. R421,441-42. Shopko filed no report

2

The testimony on this point varies, with Anastasia testifying that she
alerted her stepmom, R405, and the stepmom testifying that it was
Anastasia’s brother who alerted her, R435.
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with the police. R482. But the next day, Anastasia’s stepmom and aunt
reported what they had seen on the West Valley City Police Department’s
Facebook website. R422,447-48.
Neither Anastasia nor her stepmom saw anything out of the ordinary,
in either incident, related to Powell’s penis—there was no tubing, medical
devices, or anything else unusual on or around his penis. R405,42425,433,450,455.
3. Police investigate the complaint and Powell admits to the
conduct.
Some nine months later, Detective Jason Vincent from the West Valley
City Police Department began investigating the Facebook complaint. R42223,448,457,468. After getting written statements from both women, he
checked with Walmart and Shopko to determine whether they had
surveillance video of the two incidents. R457-58,469-70. Det. Vincent learned
that Walmart only keeps surveillance footage for about 30 days and had
already recorded over it. R458,470. But Shopko still had surveillance video
from Thanksgiving that he was allowed to review. R458.
In watching the video, Det. Vincent saw a man in a wheelchair—whom
he subsequently identified as Powell—enter and later exit Shopko, and he
was able to partially track his movements in the store (the surveillance
cameras do not provide full coverage of the entire store). R460,471-72,478-79.
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In tracking Powell’s movements, he “never found any footage of him
exposing himself,” despite the ability to zoom in on images. R472. Det.
Vincent did not see either complainant in the video, but was focusing on
Powell. R483. Det. Vincent captured two screen shots that demonstrated no
more than the fact that Powell was at the Shopko on Thanksgiving night—
one showing his face and upper body in a clothing aisle and the other
showing a van. R458-59; SE2-3.
Det. Vincent and another officer conducted a knock-and-talk at
Powell’s residence. R460. Det. Vincent explained why he was there and asked
Powell if they could look through his cell phone and computer. R461. Powell
consented and while the assisting officer looked through the two electronic
devices, Det. Vincent questioned Powell about the reports. See R461,480.3
That officer “did not locate anything criminal” on either Powell’s cell phone
or computer. R475. The two officers also looked around the house but did not
find any pants with mesh over the crotch area or anything else that was
incriminating. R475-76,480.

3

West Valley City equips officers with a body cam, but because Det.
Vincent is also on loan with Homeland Security, which does not permit body
cams, he was not wearing a body cam when he interviewed Powell at his
residence. R473-74,479.
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Det. Vincent asked Powell if he was at Walmart and Shopko and he
confirmed that he was. R462. When Det. Vincent asked why he was exposing
himself, Powell explained that when he was 27 years old, he became
paralyzed from the waist down following a car accident. R461-62. He said
that before the accident, he was a “thrill seeker” and participated in
dangerous activities or sports. R461-62. He explained that since that time,
exposing himself was “one of the things that he did to create excitement in
his life”—“for the thrill of it.” R462. He admitted that when he did it, he wore
a see-through mesh material. R463. He also admitted that this was not an
isolated incident. R467. He was initially coy about how often he went into the
community exposing himself, but ultimately admitted that he did so two or
three times a month. R464.
In his written statement, Powell largely confirmed what he told Det.
Vincent—admitting that he began resorting to lewd behavior for the adrenaline rush. R466; SE4A-B. But in that statement, he added for the first time that
his condom catheter became kinked while at the Shopko on Thanksgiving
night and he tried to unkink it so he wouldn’t wet his pants. R467,476-77,48182. He stated, however, that he did not believe anyone saw him doing so, but
said he could be wrong. R467,476-77; SE4A-4B. He also stated that he’s been
confronted about it before and feels bad for doing it. R467-68; SE4A-4B.
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B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
Powell was charged with two counts of lewdness, enhanced to third
degree felonies for two prior lewdness convictions, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-702(2)(b) (Westlaw, 2014). R1-4,121-23. At the close of the State’s
case in a one-day, bifurcated trial, the defense moved for a directed verdict,
arguing that because the two witnesses’ testimony was not corroborated by
any additional information, the evidence was insufficient to submit the case
to the jury. R491-92. The court denied the motion. R492.
The jury found Powell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both
lewdness counts and the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell
was guilty of the enhancements. R176-78,532-34.4 After submission of a
presentence investigation report, the district court sentenced Powell to two
concurrent prison terms of up to five years. R220-21.
Powell timely appealed. R223-24,230. And in connection with his
appeal, Powell filed a rule 23B remand motion for findings supporting a
claim that counsel was ineffective (1) by improperly advising him regarding
his right not to testify at trial, and (2) by not filing a motion to suppress his

4

This was a second trial. The first resulted in a mistrial before
testimony was taken, when one of the jurors disclosed a bias she had not
made known during voir dire. R297-301.
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statements to Det. Vincent on the ground that the detective did not advise
him of his Miranda rights. See Rule 23B Motion to Remand.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Powell claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss
the case on due process grounds, arguing that the State failed to preserve the
surveillance video. But the State never possessed the Walmart surveillance
video—it had already been recorded over before the detective could see it—
and the detective only collected the screenshots from the Shopko video.
Moreover, the record does not support Powell’s claim that the Shopko video
was lost or destroyed. In light of controlling caselaw, reasonable counsel
could conclude that a motion to dismiss would fail. And among the reasons
it would fail is that the video would show no more than what the State
admitted—the video did not show Powell with his genitals exposed.
Powell also claims that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
elements instructions for lewdness. But again, reasonable counsel could
conclude that the elements instructions accurately set forth the law, i.e.,
lewdness does not involve an attempt, the relevant mental state for lewdness
includes recklessness, and caselaw defining “any other act of lewdness” did
not apply in this case because Powell’s charges rested on evidence that he
exposed his genitals.
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Powell also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence. But where Anastasia and
her mother testified that they saw Powell with his genitals exposed in
Walmart and Shopko, and Powell admitted to the detective that he was at the
stores on the nights in question and exposed himself for the thrill of it, the
evidence was more than sufficient to submit the case to the jury.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Powell’s trial counsel was not ineffective for not
moving to dismiss the case on due process grounds and
for not objecting to the elements instructions on
lewdness.
Powell claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
two reasons. He contends that counsel was ineffective for not moving to
dismiss the case on due process grounds for the alleged failure of the police
department to preserve exculpatory evidence, to wit, surveillance videos
from both Walmart and Shopko. Aplt.Br. 35-50 (point III). And he argues that
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the elements instructions on
lewdness. Aplt.Br. 5-20 (point I).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must make the two-part showing established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). He must prove that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient,”
and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.
Because a defendant must make “both showings,” a failure to prove either
Strickland element is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim. Id. The bar for
proving ineffective assistance is high and “never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). Powell has not overcome that high bar.
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A. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to dismiss the
case on due process grounds.
Powell claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
dismiss the case on due process grounds based on the police department’s
alleged failure to preserve video surveillance from Walmart and Shopko.
Aplt.Br. 35-50. As noted, Powell “must show both that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there exists a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Powell’s ineffective-assistance claim fails for three
reasons. First, his claim is not, at least in part, supported by the record.
Second, Powell does not argue, let alone prove, that counsel’s performance
was both deficient and prejudicial. And third, counsel could not prove either
deficient performance or prejudice.
1. The record does not support Powell’s contention that the
Shopko surveillance video was not available to trial
counsel.
Powell’s ineffective-assistance claim fails at the outset because it is
based, at least in part, on alleged facts not supported by the record.
The law is settled that “a defendant cannot bring an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on appeal without pointing to specific instances
in the record demonstrating both counsel’s deficient performance and the
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prejudice it caused defendant.” State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ¶16 (emphasis
added). Powell’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
dismiss rests, in part, on the premise that the State seized the Shopko
surveillance video, never made it available to trial counsel, and then lost or
destroyed it. But none of those alleged facts appear in the record.
Powell claims that Det. Vincent “lost or destroyed [the video] after
viewing the footage.” Aplt.Br. 42,46-47 (cleaned up). But he does not cite to
anything in the record supporting that proposition. Det. Vincent testified that
Shopko pulled the surveillance video for him, that he reviewed it, and that
he took some screenshots showing Powell in the store and Powell’s van
outside the store. R458-59; SE2-3. But there is nothing in the record suggesting
that Det. Vincent kept the video, that it was not available for trial counsel’s
review at Shopko, or if the detective kept the video, that he lost or destroyed
it, or that the prosecution did not make it available to trial counsel.
In sum, the record does not support the allegations made in the brief
related to the Shopko video. Consequently, Powell’s ineffective-assistance
claim related to the Shopko video fails at the outset.
2. Powell fails to argue, let alone prove, both deficient
performance and prejudice.
In any event, Powell’s ineffective-assistance argument on appeal is
fatally lacking.
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As noted, Powell must show both deficient performance and prejudice
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. But because “defense counsel’s
failure to litigate a [due process] claim is the principle allegation” of Powell’s
claim of ineffectiveness,” he bears an additional burden: he “must also prove
that his … claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that
the verdict would have been different” as a result. Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, in addition to proving deficient performance and prejudice,
Powell must prove that any such motion would have succeeded. If he cannot
do that, his ineffectiveness claim is a nonstarter. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT
41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 546. On the other hand, proving that he would have succeeded
on the motion is not nearly enough to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim—it
is only a beginning. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, a concession that
a particular motion would have succeeded “is not the same as a concession that
no competent attorney would think a motion … would have failed, which is the
relevant question under Strickland.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011)
(emphasis added).
In his brief, Powell does no more than argue that a motion to dismiss
on due process grounds would have succeeded. Relying on the due process
analysis set forth in State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, 395 P.3d 111, Powell contends
that (1) there is a reasonable probability the surveillance videos would have

-17-

been exculpatory, Aplt.Br. 38-41, and (2) dismissal was merited because
(a) the police department had a duty to collect and preserve the evidence,
Aplt.Br. 41-44, and (b) its failure to do so resulted in prejudice inasmuch as
the surveillance footage “would have been a complete and continuously
filmed recording of [him] while he was in the store,” Aplt.Br. 45-50. This is
the sum and substance of Powell’s ineffective-assistance argument.
Powell’s ineffective-assistance claim is lacking. Indeed, the Court can,
for the sake of argument, assume that a motion to dismiss “would have
succeeded,” Premo, 562 U.S. at 124, just as Powell argues in his brief, Aplt.Br.
35-50. But “that is not the same as [demonstrating] that no competent attorney
would think a motion to [dismiss] would have failed, which is the relevant
question under Strickland.” Id. Even though “a meritorious [due process]
issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim like [Powell’s],
a good [due process] claim alone will not earn” him relief on appeal.
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382. Powell must still “prove under Strickland that [he
has] been denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence of [his] attorneys.” Id.
Because Powell does no more than argue that a motion to dismiss on
due process grounds would have succeeded, he has not surmounted the
“highly demanding” burden of proving ineffective assistance. See id. He has
not argued, let alone proven, that his counsel was deficient for not moving to
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dismiss on due process grounds. Again, that is so even assuming arguendo
the motion would have succeeded—Powell must also demonstrate that “no
competent attorney would think a motion to [dismiss] would have failed.”
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. He has not argued, let alone proven, that not filing the
motion resulted in prejudice. In the context of Strickland, that means that had
he filed a motion, there is a “substantial” likelihood of a different result at
trial. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12 (2011). For these reasons, Powell
has not overcome the high bar for proving ineffective assistance and the
Court should reject his claim.
3. Powell could not prove that all competent counsel would
believe that a motion to dismiss would succeed.
In any event, Powell could not meet Strickland’s high bar because
reasonable counsel could conclude that any motion to dismiss would fail (and
incidentally, it would have). Applying its holding in State v. Tiedemann, 2007
UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, the Utah Supreme Court in DeJesus recognized a “twostep analysis” in assessing whether a defendant’s due process rights are
violated when the State loses or destroys evidence in its possession, and if so,
the appropriate sanction. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶27. First, the defendant must
make a “threshold” showing that the State violated due process by
“demonstrating a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have
been exculpatory.” Id. Second, if the defendant makes that threshold
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showing, the court then “must balance the culpability of the State and the
prejudice to the defendant in order to gauge the seriousness of the due
process violation and to determine an appropriate remedy.” Id.
But caselaw governing the State’s due process obligation to preserve
evidence extends only to evidence it possesses: “It is a matter of clear Utah
law that criminal defendants are entitled to information possessed by the State
to aid in their defense.” State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶40, 162 P.3d 1106
(emphasis added).
Reasonable counsel could thus conclude that the due process
requirements identified in Tiedemann and DeJesus did not apply here because
the State never possessed the video footage. Det. Vincent never even saw
video footage from Walmart because by the time the case came across his
desk, Walmart had recorded over it. R458,470. And although Det. Vincent
testified that Shopko pulled surveillance video for him to review, R458, the
record does not show that he seized the recording. He testified that he
“collected some of that,” to wit, the photo showing Powell in the store (SE2)
and the photo of Powell’s van (SE3). See R458-59. Det. Vincent’s video review
was akin to police investigating a crime scene in search of physical
evidence—detectives will collect evidence they conclude is relevant and leave
the rest behind. In this case, Det. Vincent confirmed that the surveillance
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video never captured Powell with his genitals exposed. R472. As a result, he
captured screen shots establishing Powell’s presence in the store that night—
nothing more.
In arguing a due process violation, Powell makes broad and farreaching claims that the stores themselves have an “independent duty … to
maintain the video” and that law enforcement has a duty to conduct “some
minimal police investigation to preserve potential evidence for future use,”
including “an initial quick inquiry” so that video evidence will be preserved.
Aplt.Br. 43-44. Powell contends that the police in this case “additionally bear
the burden for not having an immediate screening or filtering process in how
and when they respond to a citizen’s online report of a crime.” Aplt.Br. 44.
But Powell cites no case law supporting these broad propositions and the
State can find none.
A similar argument was made more than three decades ago: “The
defendant urges this Court to recognize a duty of the prosecution to gather
all relevant evidence regardless of its impact on the success of the
prosecution.” State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Utah 1986). And the Utah
Supreme Court rejected it, holding that “[a]lthough the prosecution and
investigators should preserve all incriminating and exculpatory evidence
material to a case, the prosecution is not required to search for exculpatory
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evidence, conduct tests, or exhaustively pursue every angle on a case.” Id.
(cleaned up) (emphasis added); accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶50, 979
P.2d 799 (quoting Shaffer). The Court explained that “imposing a duty on the
prosecution to search for all relevant evidence … would require Herculean
efforts by the prosecution. Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306. And imposing such a duty
“before a suspect has been identified and before the State is notified of
possible defenses, is to require the impossible.” Id.
In sum, given the facts of the case and the controlling caselaw,
reasonable counsel could conclude that a motion to dismiss would fail
because the police never possessed the surveillance videos.
Reasonable counsel could also conclude that there was not a reasonable
probability that the video would have been exculpatory—even if the State
had possessed and lost it. In DeJesus, the Utah Supreme Court held that “in
order to satisfy the reasonable probability standard in the lost evidence
context, “a defendant must make some proffer as to the lost evidence and its
claimed benefit.” 2017 UT 22, ¶39. And the court held that “[s]o long as the
lost evidence and its claimed benefit is not pure speculation or wholly
incredible, the standard will be satisfied.” Id. But Powell’s proffer here is pure
speculation.
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Without record support, Powell claims that Walmart and Shopko have
“security surveillance systems in place from above and at multiple angles
from within the store” that “would have captured his exposed state at one
angle or another for at least a second or more.” Aplt.Br. 38-39. But the only
testimony on the coverage of the surveillance cameras came from the officer,
who testified that “Shopko only has a specific amount of cameras” and thus
a person moving around the store would not always be in the camera’s view.
R478. Powell proffered no evidence—from store personnel or anyone else—
that the cameras would have captured him where the two women said he
exposed himself. Powell claims that the screenshot from the Shopko video
(SE2) shows him in the same clothing section that Anastasia and her stepmom
saw him exposing himself (SE1), but again, there was no testimony to that
fact and it is not apparent from a comparison of the photos. Again, Powell’s
claim is pure speculation.
Powell nevertheless contends that there was a reasonable probability
that the video would have provided exculpatory evidence because it “would
have been a complete and continuously filmed recording of [him] while he
was in the store.” Aplt.Br. 46. But even assuming for the sake of argument
that were true, the Utah Supreme Court has held that such is insufficient to
show a reasonable probability: “It is certainly true that a video recording of
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the incident would have been highly probative of what truly happened. But
simply stating that video recordings can be helpful to determine truth does
not establish that this particular video recording would have been helpful to
[defendant] in the specific circumstances of his case.” State v. Mohamud, 2017
UT 23, ¶21, 395 P.3d 133.
Given this case law, reasonable counsel could again conclude that a
motion to dismiss would have failed.
Additionally, reasonable counsel could conclude that dismissal would
not result even if there were a reasonable probability that the video would
have provided exculpatory information. DeJesus holds that in determining an
appropriate sanction, courts must consider both the culpability of the State
and the prejudice suffered. 2017 UT 22, ¶27. As noted, the caselaw suggests
that the State bore no responsibility for collecting the evidence. Moreover, the
State never claimed that the video would have corroborated its witnesses, as
was the case in both Tiedemann and DeJesus. In fact, Det. Vincent testified that
in tracking Powell’s movements, he “never found any footage of him
exposing himself,” despite the ability to zoom in on images. R472.
Accordingly, the video would have been no more probative than the
detective’s testimony. Under these circumstances, reasonable counsel could
conclude that a motion to dismiss would not have succeeded.

-24-

In sum, given the relevant evidence in the case and governing caselaw,
Powell has not demonstrated that “no competent attorney would think a
motion to [dismiss] would have failed, which is the relevant question under
Strickland.” Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. Nor has he demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of a different result had counsel filed a motion to dismiss.
B. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the
elements instructions on lewdness.
Powell also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to the elements instructions on lewdness. Aplt.Br. 5-20. Those instructions
required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:
1. STEVEN NORMAN POWELL;
2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly performed any of the
following acts:
a. An act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
b. Exposed his genitals, buttocks, anus, or his pubic area;
c. Masturbated; or
d. Any other act of lewdness[;]
3. And did so
a. In a public place or
b. Under circumstances which the defendant should have
known would likely cause affront or alarm to another 14
years of age or older.
R198-99 (Inst. 18-19).

-25-

Powell argues that the instruction incorrectly permitted a conviction
for performing an act of lewdness “recklessly.” Aplt.Br. 10-15. His argument
that lewdness does not involve reckless conduct rests on (1) the introductory
“not amounting to” clause of the statute that includes an attempt to commit
certain offenses, and (2) caselaw holding that an attempt requires intentional
conduct. Aplt.Br. 10-11. He also relies on a policy argument based on a
comparison of the lewdness statute with the lewdness involving a child
statute. Aplt.Br. 12-15.
But Powell’s interpretation of the statute is a novel one and reasonable
counsel could conclude that based on existing law, the instructions correctly
identified the elements of the lewdness offense. First, the plain language of
the statute supports the conclusion that “attempt” is not an element of the
offense. The lewdness statute includes a “not amounting to” clause
(italicized) and a “performance” clause (shaded):
A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under
circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy,
forcible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault, sexual abuse of a
minor, unlawful sexual conduct with a 16- or 17-year-old, custodial
sexual relations or misconduct under Section 76-5-412 or 76-5-413, or
an attempt to commit any of these offenses, performs any of the
following acts in a public place or under circumstances which
the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm to, on,
or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older:
(a) an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
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(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of
the areola, the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area;
(c) masturbates; or
(d) any other act of lewdness.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1) (Westlaw, 2019) (highlights and emphases
added).5
The statute thus provides that a person is guilty of lewdness if, “under
circumstances not amounting to” a designated offense “or an attempt to commit
any of these offenses” (not-amounting-to clause), the person “performs” any
number of specified acts (performance clause). Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, under a plain reading of the statute, the
attempt language is tied to the “not amounting to” clause, not the ensuing
performance clause.
Moreover, cases interpreting similar “not amounting to” language
have uniformly held that such clauses do not constitute an element of the
offense. See, e.g., State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 443–46 (Utah App. 1996)
(concluding that “under circumstances not amounting to rape, rape of a child
or aggravated sexual assault” is not a “discrete element of the crime of
incest”); State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶¶ 10–13, 100 P.3d 231 (analyzing

5

The State cites the current version of the statute because amendments
since the lewd conduct in this case do not affect the issues raised on appeal.
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the language “not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation” in
Utah’s internet enticement statute and concluding that the “clause does not
require the State to affirmatively prove absence of attempt, conspiracy, and
solicitation”); State v. Young, 2015 UT App 286, ¶10, 364 P.3d 55 (holding that
“Utah cases have interpreted similar provisions of other criminal statutes and
held that those provisions do not require the State to disprove the defendant’s
commission of the act or acts the statutory language excludes”).
Based on the foregoing, counsel could reasonably conclude that
attempt is not an element of lewdness. And counsel could reasonably
conclude that because the performance prong of the lewdness statute is silent
as to a mental state, the applicable mental state is, by statute, intentional,
knowing, or recklessness: “when the definition of the offense does not specify
a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.”
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Westlaw, 2019).6
Powell also contends that the instruction was erroneous because, he
argues, the statute requires that the victim of lewdness be 14 years of age or

6

Accordingly, Powell’s claim that counsel was ineffective for not
requesting a lesser included instruction for attempt is likewise unavailing. See
Aplt.Br. 15-18.
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older, whether the conduct occurs in a public place or under circumstances
that would cause affront or alarm. Aplt.Br. 6-9. Again, Powell cites no caselaw
supporting that interpretation. And reasonable counsel could conclude based
on the plain language of the statute that the 14-or-older requirement does not
apply to a lewd act performed in a public place. The statute prohibits lewd
acts “in a public place or under circumstances which the person should know
will likely cause affront or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is
14 years of age or older.” It is reasonable to read the latter phrase as one—
“under circumstances which the person should know will likely cause affront
or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older.”
In any event, reasonable counsel could also conclude that given the
undisputed facts of the case, it did not matter whether the instruction
correctly stated the law as to the age of the victim—the evidence was
undisputed that the victims here were a 24-year-old woman and her mother.
And for the same reason, there could be no prejudice. See State v. Garcia, 2017
UT 53, ¶42, 424 P.3d 171 (“A proper [Strickland] analysis also needs to focus
on the evidence before the jury and whether the jury could reasonably have
found that [defendant] acted in imperfect self-defense such that a failure to
instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdict.”).
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Finally, Powell contends that the instruction should have narrowly
defined his act of lewdness as defined in State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, 322 P.3d
719, which interpreted the lewdness-involving-a-child statute. Aplt.Br. 18-20.
But that case interpreted the meaning of “any other act of lewdness,” which
like the lewdness statute at issue here, follows a list of specifically-identified
acts of lewdness. See Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ¶¶11-12. As explained in Bagness, “[i]t
is a catchall term at the end of an exemplary list” and “must be understood
as similar in kind—involving an element of lasciviousness—to acts
enumerated in the statute.” Id. at ¶¶18-19 (cleaned up). Counsel could
reasonably conclude that an instructional definition of “any other act of
lewdness” was not required because the State’s case did not rest on the
catchall provision, but on the specifically-designated act of “exposing his or
her genitals.”
In sum, Powell has fallen far short of demonstrating ineffective
assistance of counsel. He has not demonstrated that “no competent attorney
would think” the instructions accurately stated the law. Premo, 562 U.S. at
124. And in fact, as shown, the instructions did accurately state the law.
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II.
The evidence was more than sufficient to support
Powell’s convictions for lewdness.
Finally, Powell argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict. Aplt.Br. 20-34. In support, he points to cases that have
addressed the sufficiency of evidence supporting a finding that a defendant
took “indecent liberties” under the forcible sexual abuse statute, Aplt.Br. 2223, committed “any other act of lewdness” under the lewdness-involving-a
child statute, Aplt.Br. 23-26, and committed a sexual activity with another
person for a fee. Aplt.Br. 32-34. But Powell’s conviction rested on none of
those statutory provisions or theories, but on the provision in the lewdness
statute that expressly prohibits a person from intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly “expos[ing] his or her genitals.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1)(b).
Accordingly, the only question on appeal is whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury finding that he did.
A defendant appealing the denial of a directed-verdict motion for
insufficient evidence “must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show
that the trial court erred.” State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶21, 345 P.3d 1168. To
begin with, the evidence adduced at trial—and all inferences that may fairly
be drawn from that evidence—must be reviewed “in the light most
favorable” to the jury verdict. State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29, 84 P.3d 1183.
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Any “ ‘conflicts in the evidence’ ” must therefore be resolved “ ‘in favor of the
jury verdict.’ ” State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶32, 392 P.3d 398 (quoting State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)). Moreover, the trial court’s denial of
the directed-verdict motion “lends [even] further weight to the jury’s
verdict.” State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶63, 52 P.3d 1201, abrogated on other grounds
in Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, 388 P.3d 447; accord State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23,
¶15, 210 P.3d 288. This is so because the judge “who presided over a trial is
in a far better position than an appellate court to determine … whether the
evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict.” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain
Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 24, ¶22, 309 P.3d 201.
Neither this Court nor the trial court may adjudge the evidence
insufficient so long as “ ‘some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶27 (quoting Montoya, 2004 UT 5,
¶29). The evidence presented at trial here readily satisfies that standard.
Anastasia testified that as she walked down the main aisle in Walmart
toward the cosmetics section, she saw Powell, with his penis exposed, emerge
from the women’s clothing section and into the main aisle where she was
walking. R395-99. She was less than five feet from him. R414. And she
testified that Powell did “not just [have] his zipper down, but, like, full-on
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nothing [was] covering down there”—only some kind of “like fishnet
stockings that you wear for maybe a costume” that is [v]ery see-through.”
R396. It was almost as if he owned “a pair of pants with nothing” in the crotch
area, “like [it had been] cut out,” because it was “more than just [the] zipper
being down that [she] could see.” R398. And Anastasia’s stepmom likewise
testified that when she went to verify Anastasia’s account, she saw the same
thing Anastasia saw—Powell had “jeans on and the crotch was cut out with
some black mesh, and [she] saw his penis.” R432-33,445-47.
Anastasia testified that a month later while shopping at Shopko, she
encountered Powell again with his genitals exposed as before. R403-04,419.
She saw him in the children’s clothing section and was about 20 feet from
Powell. R403-04,419. She testified that he was “wearing the same” jeans with
nothing covering his crotch and she clearly saw his genitals. R404,419. And
Anastasia’s stepmom testified that she thereafter found Powell in the men’s
clothing section with his genitals exposed as before. R405,419-20,436. And she
tried to take a picture with her smartphone, but just before she snapped the
photo, Powell saw her with the camera and grabbed the leg of a pair of slacks
hanging on a rack and placed it over his genitals. R407-10,420-21,437-41; SE1
(photo taken by stepmom).
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But this was not all. Det. Vincent testified that when he interviewed
Powell at his home, Powell confirmed that he was at Walmart and Shopko.
R462. And when Det. Vincent asked why he exposed himself, Powell
explained that it was “one of the things that he did to create excitement in his
life” following an accident that left him paralyzed from the waist down. R46162. He also testified that Powell admitted that when he did it, he wore a seethrough mesh material. R463.
This evidence was more than sufficient to support the trial court’s
denial of Powell’s motion for a directed verdict. It established that he was in
a public place—Walmart and Shopko—and that his genitals were exposed to
public view. Powell points to other evidence, or lack thereof, that did not
support the finding, such as no surveillance video showing that he was
exposed and the stepmom’s failure to take a picture showing that he was
exposed. But any “conflicts in the evidence” do not justify a directed verdict
because, when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the
case to the jury or sufficient to support the jury verdict, conflicting evidence
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must be resolved “in favor of the jury verdict.” Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶32
(cleaned up).7
Powell also contends that the evidence of the requisite mental state was
insufficient because he covered himself before Anastasia’s stepmom took a
picture, and he had explained in his written statement that at Shopko, he was
trying to undo a kink in his catheter. Aplt.Br. 27,31. While a lack of intent or
knowledge may be one inference, the jury could reject that inference in favor
of a different inference—supported by his own statement to Det. Vincent—
that he intentionally and knowingly exposed himself “for the thrill of it.”
R462. And this Court is required to accept the latter inference. See Montoya,
2004 UT 5, ¶29 (holding the evidence and all inferences fairly drawn from it
must be reviewed “in the light most favorable” to the jury verdict).
Moreover, as noted, the evidence need only have established that
Powell recklessly exposed himself. A jury could surely conclude that undoing
his pants to adjust a condom catheter in a Shopko on a relatively busy

7

Powell also points to allegations in his affidavit that Walmart security
found no evidence of him exposing himself. Aplt.Br. 30-31. But this Court
does not consider extra-record evidence on appeal and should strike it. See
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶52 n.6, 150 P.3d 480 (observing that court does
not generally consider extra-record evidence on appeal). In any event, and as
explained, such conflicting evidence would not form a basis for a directed
verdict. See Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶32.
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shopping day was reckless behavior. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3)
(Westlaw, 2019) (providing a person acts recklessly “when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or that the result will occur”). Thus, Powell’s claimed
rationale for being exposed is hardly a defense to the charges.
In sum, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the lewdness
charges and to submit the case to the jury.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Powell’s
convictions.
Respectfully submitted on June 11, 2019.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
/s/ Jeffrey S. Gray
JEFFREY S. GRAY
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (Westlaw, 2019) (Lewdness)

Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702 (Westlaw, 2019). Lewdness.
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under circumstances not
amounting to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, aggravated
sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, unlawful sexual conduct with a 16- or 17year-old, custodial sexual relations or misconduct under Section 76-5-412 or 76-5413, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, performs any of the following
acts in a public place or under circumstances which the person should know will
likely cause affront or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of
age or older:
(a) an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola,
the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area;
(c) masturbates; or
(d) any other act of lewdness.
(2) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection
(1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, except under Subsection (2)(b).
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a third
degree felony if at the time of the violation:
(i) the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7;
(ii) the person has been previously convicted two or more times of
violating Subsection (1); or
(iii) the person has previously been convicted of a violation of
Subsection (1) and has also previously been convicted of a violation of
Section 76-9-702.5.
(c) (i) For purposes of this Subsection (2) and Subsection 77-41-102(17), a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge under this section that is held in abeyance
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction.
(ii) This Subsection (2)(c) also applies if the charge under this Subsection
(2) has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in
abeyance agreement.
(3) A woman's breast feeding, including breast feeding in any location where
the woman otherwise may rightfully be, does not under any circumstance constitute
a lewd act, irrespective of whether or not the breast is covered during or incidental to
feeding.

ADDENDUM B
 State’s Exhibit 1 (witness’s photo of Powell in Shopko)
 State’s Exhibit 2 (surveillance screenshot of Powell in Shopko)
 State’s Exhibit 3 (surveillance screenshot of Powell’s van in
Shopko parking lot)

